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Making Bankruptcy Work for Consumers: 
Suggested Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act· 
By 
RICHARD A. GROSSI 
AND 
CATHARINE HANTZIS2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On October 2, 1975, in one of the most· spectacular commercial 
failures in modern memory, W. T. Grant, Inc. declared bank-
ruptcy.3 Public comment was focused on the plight of the 
thousands of employees who would be out of jobs,4 the potential 
*The authors gratefully acknowledge the technical assistance provided them by 
Gregory Williams and Bruce Merrill and the staff of the New England Law Review 
in the preparation of this article. 
I Assistant Attorney General and Deputy Chief, Consumer Protection Division, De· 
partment of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts; B.A. Wesleyan 
University, 1970; J.D. Harvard University, 1973. 
2 Assistant Attorney General, Department of the Attorney General, Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts; B.A. Wellesley College, 1968; M.A. University of California, 
Berkeley, 1973; .J.D. Harvard University, 1976. 
3In Re W.T. Grant, Inc., No. 75-B-1735, (S.D.N.Y., petition filed Oct. 2, 1975). 
4 "W.T. Grant Asks for Bankruptcy Status," N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1975, p. 1, 
col. 2. 
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loss that the store's financing banks would suffer,5 and the 
battery of lawyers and accountants who would work for years 
to lay the company's financial affairs to rest.6 In all of the fuss, 
however, there was little attention focused on the most innocent 
group affected by the bankruptcy: the consumer creditors. For 
the thousands who had made lay-away purchases from Grant in 
the weeks preceding the bankruptcy, for those who held 
"Grant's cash" or merchandise certificates and had not con-
verted them into goods prior to the bankruptcy, and for the 
uncounted number who had warranty claims arising out of pur-
chases made at the store, the bankruptcy meant the probable 
loss of any possibility of recovery against the merchant. While 
the employees will be paid some of their past due wages, while 
the government will receive payment on any unpaid tax liability, 
while the major banks will, undoubtedly, receive at least partial 
payment on their loans, Grant's customers will most likely not 
receive one cent. Even though they had dealt with the store in 
good faith, answering advertisements and shopping with the 
confidence the store's well-founded reputation was meant to 
induce, these consumers will be innocent victims without a rem-
edy under the Bankruptcy Act. 
The Grant problem is not atypical. Each day hundreds of 
businesses file either "straight" bankruptcy 7 or "arrange-
ments" 8 and their customers are thereby victimized. Com-
monly, a failing business tries to accelerate sales in order to 
salvage itself. When it is unsuccessful, bankruptcy occurs, 
leaving purchasers to their remedies under the Bankruptcy Act. 
But the Bankruptcy Act deprives unsuspecting consumers of 
essential rights. This paper will analyze how that happens and 
what can be done to protect these innocent victims of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 
5 "W.T. Grant Files Bankruptcy Petition Marking Failure of its Turnaround Ef· 
forts," Wall Street J ollrnal, Oct. 3, 1975, p. 28, col. l. 
6 "Full Effect of Grant Filing May Not be Known for Six Months," Boston 
Evening Globe, Oct. 3, 1975, p. 25, col. l. 
711 U.S.C., §§ 1·112. (The Bankruptcy Act is found at 11 U.S.C. § I, et. seq., but 
is commonly known by the section numhers of the Act itself rather than by United 
States Code numbers.) The Act contemplates both liquidations (or" straight bank· 
ruptcy") and reorganizations (known as "chapter proceedings"). 
8 11 U.S.C., §~ 501-676 and ~~ 701-799. 
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A Definitions 
An important point, by way of definition, must be made at 
the outset. The focus of this discussion is on consumers ·as cre-
ditors in bankruptcy proceedings. While there has been much 
comment elsewhere on the plight of individuals filing bank-
ruptcy petitions as debtors,9 their problems are unrelated to 
those of consumer creditors. Status as a debtor in bankruptcy 
can arise either by a self-filed petition 10 or a petition filed by 
the bankrupt's creditorsY It is not necessary, however, to take 
any affirmative action to become a consumer creditor. That 
status arises because of the existence of a bankruptcy proceeding 
filed by a business with which the consumer has had commercial 
dealings. To the extent the consumer seeks to assert any claims 
against the bankrupt company on account of that commer-
cial relationship, the consumer becomes a creditor in the 
bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Act defines this status as, "anyone 
who owns a debt, demand or claim provable in bankruptcy ... " 12 
The fact that no affirmative act is required to achieve the 
status of creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding is one of the 
primary causes of victimization of consumer creditors. Those 
who make purchases for their personal, family, or household 
use do not see themselves as creditors in that relationship. They 
are consumers in that they are people" who use goods or services 
for their own needs." 13 Their intention in the transaction is 
neither profit-making nor risk-taking. They are not in the market 
as sellers, but rather solely to buy for their own use. Nothing 
in their situation seems analagous to the position of a financing 
bank or other lender. It is therefore not surprising that con-
sumer creditors fail to recognize their status under the Act. 
9 See Wickham, Bankruptcy or Not? Ai/vice for Attorneys 1vho Counsel Con-
sumer Debtors, 41 TENN. LAW. REV. 667 (1974); and Festersen Equitable Powers 
in Bankruptcy Rehabilitation, " CREIGHTON L. REV. 221 (1971). 
10 U.S.C. ~ 95(a) (1962); 11 U.S.C. ~ 526 (1938); 11 U.S.C. ~ 721 (1938); 
11 U.S.C. ~ 821 (1938). 
11 U.S.C. ~ 9,,(b) (Hl62); 11 U.S.C. ~ :,26 (1938). 
12 11 U.S.C., ~ 1 (1970). 
13 Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, World Publishing 
Company, 1973, at 129. 
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Further, because such creditors are often unrecognized by busi-
ness debtors or not listed in their bankruptcy petitions as re-
quired by law, 14 they never get notice of the proceedings.15 
The problem of defining the consumer creditor is complicated 
by the many variations in which helshe might obtain that status. 
Those consumers who secure their purchases with deposits and 
reserve the remaining balance to be paid upon delivery of the 
promised good or service are creditors for the amount· of the 
deposit if the seller files bankruptcy prior to completing per-
formance required under the contract. Such a creditor may also 
have a claim for the benefit of the bargain under the contract or 
warranty claims arising from the contract.16 Those who purchase 
services on time are creditors to the extent that their payments 
exceed the pro-rata value of the services received under the 
contract. Those who purchase goods on time, however, are not 
creditors of the bankrupt debtor because they owe performance 
to the debtor, not vice versaY Finally, those who prepay en-
tirely for services to be delivered at a later date, i.e. payment 
now for an airline trip next week, become creditors if the air-
line becomes bankrupt prior to carrying the passenger to his/ 
her destination. 
Examples of the creation of consumer creditors out of whole 
classes of unsuspecting individuals abound. In In re Land Auc-
tion Bureau and Auction Value Land of Boston, Inc. ls purchasers 
of parcels of "up-country" land on an installment basis were 
totally confused about their status as creditors of the company 
after Land Auction filed for Chapter XI arrangements on Feb-
14 11 U.S.C., § 25 (1970) requires the debtor to list all of his pre-bankruptcy credo 
itors with the bankruptcy court. 
15 See Schrag and Ratner, Caveat Emptor-Empty Coffer: The Bankrupt!>y Lau) 
Has Nothing to Offer, 72 COL. L. REV. 1147 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Schrag and 
Ratner]. While creditors who are unscheduled can not have their debts discharged 
(11 U.S.C., § 35), it is often true that a post-bankruptcy claim is worthless. 
16 Query whether such a claim is "provable" in Bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 103 
(1970). 
17 See, e.g. MASS. GEN. LAWS. c. 255D, § 1. Note that those purchasing goods on 
time must often receive the merchandise "up front", although title may not pass 
until the payments are complete under the contract. Nevertheless, warranty claims 
arising out of time-payment contracts may confer creditor status on a consumer. 
18 Nos. 75-244-HL and 75-831-HL (D.Mass., petition filed February 3, 1975). 
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ruary 3, 1975.19 The company had promised delivery of good 
title to the land to those who chose to make purchases. It also 
offered a full refund of deposits to those who changed their 
mind about purchasing land within a specified time. Tho-se who 
had made deposits under the refund option clause had far less 
conceptual difficulty with their status as creditors, in general, 
than those who had purchased land, fronted the money, and were 
merely awaiting deeds or mortgage discharges. Indeed, the num-
ber of attorneys who advised their clients that they had made 
purchases and were therefore not creditors was amazing. 
Similarly, in In re New En,qland Spas, d/b/a Cosmopolitan 
Health Spas/o over 8,000 spa members were notified by the 
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that 
the spas' bankruptcy made them creditors for the balance of 
their prepaid, unperformed memberships at several spas located 
in Massachusetts.21 It is in the nature of the health spa business 
that consumers prepay for extended memberships. The spas 
use these funds immedi.ately with the expectation that many 
consumers will "drop-out." Thus the consumer provides much 
of the financi.ng for the spa's operations.22 In New England 
Spas, only the existence of a successor spa to honor member-
ships from the bankrupt one prevented widespread loss to the 
unsatisfied consumers. A large proportion of those responding 
to the Attorney General even vigorously denied that they were 
creditors.23 
Finally, one ·of the largest Chapter XII petitions ever filed 
in the First Circuit also illustrates this point.24 The investors in 
Colonial Realty Trust had purchased priority participations 
worth, in some cases, $10,000, which became nearly worthless 
upon the Trust's insolvency. In addition, the Trust owned a 
19 See correspondence on file in the Consumer Protection Division, Department of 
the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
20 No. 7il·2182·L, CD.Mass., petition filed Sept. 3, 1975). 
21 See "Letter to the Creditors of Cosmopolitan Health Spas" from Paula W. 
Gold, Esq. and R.ichard A. Gross, Esq. dated Feb. 12, 1976. 
22 See In the Matter of Plaza Club, Iuc., F.T.C. Docket No. C·2134, (1972). 
23 See correspondence on file iu the Consumer Protection Division, Department of 
the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
24 In Re Colonial Realty Investmeut Trust, No. 74·1ilil7·G, (D. Mass., Petition filed 
Nov. 1, 1974), and companion cases. 
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large number of residential apartments, the residents of which 
had claims for the return of security deposits at the time of the 
bankruptcy. We consider such purchasers as consumers who 
purchase items for personal, family, or household purposes.25 
To date, neither group of "consumers" has recognized their 
status as creditors by filing proofs of claim in the court. 
B. Size of the Problem 
Accurate data as to the number of consumer creditors in 
bankruptcies filed in the past few years is impossible to obtain 
because the definition of who qualifies for the status is often 
difficult to appl~ in particular cases. One starting point, however, 
must be the number of commercial bankruptcies filed, including 
arrangements of all kinds. The National Commission on the 
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States reports that the number 
of business bankruptcies was 19,103 in 1971.26 All indications are 
that the number is increasing. When one considers that the num-
ber of consumer creditors may often be overwhelming in individ-
ual cases (i.e. 114,000 reported by Schrag in In Re F AS Int'l 
Corp.,27 over 8,000 in New England Spas, d/b/a Cosmopolitan 
Health Spas,28 and as yet uncounted numbers in the Grant pro-
ceeding 29) the problem appears to be of enormous dimensions. 
C. Previous Analyses of the Problem 
The most complete statement of the problems encountered by 
consumer creditors in bankruptcy proceedings appears in 
Caveat Emptor, Empty Coffer: The Bankruptcy Law has Noth-
ing to Offer.30 The solutions proposed for consumer creditors 
in that article, however, do not appear to us to go far enough. 
'¥bile their proposed procedural reforms regarding the place 
25 See MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 93A, ~ 9. 
26 Report of the NatilYTUll Co'mmission on the Bankruptcy Laws Of the United 
States, Part I, p. 33. 
27 No. 72B·128 (S.D.N.Y., petition filed Feb. 8, 1972). 
28 See note 20, supra. 
29 See note 3, supra. 
30 72 COL. L. REV. 1148, (1972). 
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and time of bankruptcy hearing:f; involving' substantial num-
bers of consumer creditors would bC' helpful, and the recom-
mended simplification of the bankruptcy forms (like so much 
other legal writing') is desirahle, these sug'gestions will not 
eliminate the injustices that befall consumer creditors in bank-
ruptcy. Professor Schl'a~~' has accurately identified the problem 
areas: the size of consumer creditor claims being too' small to 
justify the individual expense of hiring an attorney; the inability 
of individuals to operate effectively within an overwhelming and 
callous system; the consumer creditors' position outside the 
"bankruptcy club"; and finally, the difficulty of proving con-
structive trusts or other theories which would give priority 
status to their claims. The solutions they proposed, however, 
would not materially affect the status of consumer creditors as 
victims in the bankruptcy process in our opinion. 
An examination of the various solutions advanced by Profes-
sors Schrag and Ratner and others to improve the position of 
the consumer creditor in bankruptcy, as well as a review of pro-
posals of various statutory alternatives which states might adopt 
constitutionally to protect their consumers leads one to the con-
clusion that reform of the Bankruptcy Act is the only acceptable 
method of achieving justice for consum'er creditors in bank-
ruptcy. Suggested amendments to the current proposals now 
being considered by Congress are presented below with a com-
mentary.S1 These amendments are designed to balance the bank-
ruptcy process so that important commercial interests are dis-
turbed as little as possible. 
To the extent that any disruption of traditional modes of 
distributing the assets of insolvent businesses will cause con-
cern to the financial community, these proposals will constitute 
a threat. But if they are viewed (as the authors intend) as a fair 
attempt to create a bankruptcy law which causes the least dis-
ruption to all seg'ments of the economy affected by commercial 
insolvency, they will produce meaningful dialogue between con-
sumer and financial interests in the resolution of a common 
problem. 
al See text accompanying footnotes 1~2-130. infra. 
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II. SEEKING RELIEF UNDER CURRENT LAW 
Before seeking federal statutory remedies to a particular 
problem, it is important that the proponents of such changes 
review other, less drastic methods of accomplishing the same 
goal. Attempts have been made to obtain a just result from 
the bankruptcy court for the innocent consumer through state 
statutory schemes as well as through the common law. Addi-
tionally, amendments to the Bankruptcy Act and various pro-
cedural devices have been utilized to this end. These efforts 
have not proved satisfactory. 
A. Relief Under State Law 
There are a number of sources of relief which state legisla-
tures and courts have tried to adopt to pr.ovide consumers III 
bankruptcy with some measure of justice. 
1) Section 2-502 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
Perhaps the most notable source is Section 2-502 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.32 This section of the Code is intended to 
provide some relief to buyers in the ordinary course who dis-
cover that the seller has become insolvent within ten days of 
tender of their payment.S3 Professor Countryman has argued, 
however, that this section is unconstitutional because it operates 
only upon the debtor/seller's insolvency and appears, therefore, 
32 Section 2-502 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides: 
1) Subject to subsection (2) and even though the goods have not been shipped, 
a buyer who has paid a part or all of the price of goods in which he has a 
special property under the provisions of the immediately preceding section may 
on making and keeping good a tender of any unpaid portion of their price re-
cover them from the seller if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after 
receipt of the first installment on their price. 
2) If the identification creating his special property has been made by the buyer 
he acquires the right to recover the goods only if they conform to the contract 
for sale. 
33 Other sections of the Code concern additional protections available to the buyer 
in the ordinary course, i.e. taking security in other collateral (~ 9-204(1]) or in 
goods identified to the contract (~ 9-204(3]). We assume that the ordinary consumer 
neither takes such security nor does he perfect it and therefore these protections do 
him/her little good. 
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to conflict with Section 67 (c)' (1) (A) of the Bankruptcy Act.sSA 
Furthermore, setting aside the issue of constitutionality, Section 
2-502 benefits only those consumers who 1) purchase from sellers 
becoming insolvent within ten days after they have made their 
downpayment and 2) when the consumer has a "special prop-
erty" in the goods which are the subject matter of the contract. 
Few consumers qualify for protection under this provision. With 
regard to the ten-day limitation, it has been pointed out that 
many retailers become insolvent long before they actually cease 
doing business.34 Under Section 2-501 of the Code, a special 
property arises only when the goods are specifically identified 
to the contract either by agreement, tagging, seller's identifi-
cation of same in the warehouse or elsewhere, or by shipping. 
With the exception of certain "big-ticket" consumer items, it 
is rare that such identification actually takes place in the limita-
tion period. For example, when purchasing a new automobile, 
the consumer can ordinarily expect delivery of the next con-
forming model produced in Detroit. Similarly, the refrigerator 
shown on the retail selling floor is not the one which will be de-
livered. Section 2-502 is thus little help to most consumers. 
2) Constructive Trusts 
State law traditionally provides some remedy for those who 
have been dealt with unfairly in a commercial context by allowing 
the fiction of a trust to be established on the monies wrongly 
received or taken. 35 However, even though a court may be willing 
33A See Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.M.L. Rev. 435 
(1972). Under § 67(c)(1)(A) added by the 1967 amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Act (11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1) (A) [1967]) the trustee may avoid state·created liens 
which are effecth'e only in bankruptcy. See In Re Crosstown Motors, Inc. 272 F. 2d 
224 (7th Cir., 1959), cert. denied 363 U.S. 811 (1960) and Northwest Day Supply 
Co. v. Valenti, 343 F. 2d 7;)6 (1st Cir., 1965). 
34 See Schrag & Ratner, supra note 15, at 1161·1162. 
35 For Massachusetts r:lses est:l hlishing :lnd defining the doctrine of constructive 
trust see U.S. v. Newbury MFG. Co., 36 F. Supp. 602 (D.C. Mass. 1941); Meskell v. 
Meskell, 355 Mass. 148 (1969) (refusal to perform an oral promise alone not sufficient 
fraud to establish trust); State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Beale, 353 Mass. 103 
(1967) (fraud in obtaining legal title to property sufficient to impose trust); Barry 
v. Couch, 332 Mass. 338 (1955) (use of information confidentially received at ex-
pense of one who provided it sufficient to impose trust for his benefit); and Ranicar 
v. Goodwin, 326 Mass. 710, (1951), (refusing to impose a trust upon a son's breach 
of his oral promise to his father). 
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to restore a defrauded consumer to his previous position, the 
requirement of "tracing" the funds in the estate of the "trus-
tee" has been imposed traditionally as a limitation on this 
remedy.36 Because of these strict requirements on the creation 
or imposition of a constructive trust, and because some courts 
refuse to allow such trusts in the absence of a fiduciary relation-
ship,37 this doctrine is often no help to consumers seeking the 
return of their deposits.38 
A doctrine of general applicability regarding the imposition 
of a trust relationship on property in the hands of the debtor, 
would be an effective tool for the benefit of consumer creditors 
in bankruptcy. The benefit to the class of consumer creditors on 
whose behalf such a trust might be established is that payment 
to them would occur prior to distribution of the debtor's assets 
through the court. The theory is that money held in trust is not 
the property of the debtor and not properly the subject of 
distribution along with his other assets. The beneficiary of such 
funds could claim them regardless of the existence of other pri-
orities.39 However, because of the traditional limitations on trust 
doctrine through the common law, the authors have concluded 
that consumers must seek the expansion of this remedy legis-
latively.40 
3) Piercing the Corporate Veil 
Another approach which might be used effectively in proper 
cases is to take direct action against any individual or company 
36 Lowe v. Jones, 192 Mass. 94 (1906). See also Howard v. Fay, 138 Mass. 104 
(1884); Attorney General v. Brigham, 142 Mass. 248; Little v. Chadwick, 151 Mass. 
109 (1890); Morgato v. Morgato, Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. (1973) 242. In Worcester 
Bank and Trust Co. v. Nordblum, 285 Mass. 22 (1933) it was said: 
It is only where some of the assets can be shown to be a part of the trust 
estate or the product of the conversion of specific funds or property of the trust 
estate into another form that the trust estate can obtain an advantage over 
creditors generally. That ailvantage does not equal a right to priority prefer-
ence, but rather a right to reclaim assets of the trust estate that can be traced 
and found. I d. at 25. 
37 See Bromfield v. Kosaw, 349 Mass. 749 (1965). See, generally, Note: Imposition 
of a Constructive Trust in New England, 41 B.U.L. REV. 78, (1961). 
38 See the discussion of this problem in Schrag and Ratner, op. cit., at 1151-1157. 
39 See 3A Colliers, Bankruptcy Law, ~ 64.02 (14th Ed., 1970) and 4A Colliers 
~ 70.25 for a discussion of this proposition. 
40 See text accompanying notes 122-130, infra. 
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who may be charged with operating the debtor's business to the 
prejudice of the public. 
The protection of the Bankruptcy Court does not· extend to 
those who cause the debtor to become insolvent and who are not 
debtors themselves. Consumer protection statutes of general 
application 41 or common law notions of fraud or misrepresenta-
tion might well be asserted against one who causes an insolvent 
company to receive deposits or enter into contracts which it knows 
or should know it cannot perform.42 The same theory might well 
be advanced against officers or directors of insolvent corpora-
tions by piercing the corporate veil to reach them in their 
individual capacities.4a Under either theory, however, recovery 
occurs outside the Bankruptcy Court proceedings. Nevertheless, 
it suggests an often forgotten remedy. The protection of the 
Bankruptcy Court is only conferred upon the debtor; other par-
ticipating parties have 110 preferred or protected status insulat-
ing them from liability merely because the debtor, against whom 
the consumer ordinarily might also have an action, is in bank-
ruptcy. 
4) Enjoining Future Conduct 
Finally, the remedy of prohibition of future offending behavior 
is effective to limit the potential harm an insolvent company can 
continue to do to the public. The appropriate party to bring such 
an action is a state law enforcement official rather than a private 
party class representative.44 The purpose of such an action would 
41 See, e.g. MASS. GEN. LAWS, c. 93A. 
42 See Commonwealth v. Keene, Mass. Supreme Judicia.l Court No. 7;;·91 Civil 
(complaint filed March 28, H)7:;) for a case in which surh conduct is alleged to be 
unlawful. 
43 Some Massachusetts rases setting forth the standards for holding corporate 
officers and directors personally liable ar(': Cel·tmont v. Marsch, 68 F. 2d 460 (1st Cir., 
1933); Hallett Y. Moore, 282 Mass. 380 (1938); Rice Y. Price. 340 Mass. ,,02 (1960). 
Sec also My Bread Baking Co. \'. Cumherlalld Farms, 353 Mass. 614 (lnGi) and 
Comm. Y. Abbott Engineering, 351 Mass. 368 (1967). 
44 Prospective relief is available in the usual case only to those who can show 
actual harm will come to them. It is pa.rticularly difficult to establish this criterion 
in commercial law settings (as distinguished, perhaps, from civil rights class ac· 
t.ions.) Sec e.g., Baldassari \'. Public Fillance 1'rust, Mass. Ad\,. Sh. (197,,) 3188. 
Indeed, in such a case (where the relief is to protect as of yet unidentified and 
nonexistent members of the "class' ') it is arguable that there is no actual case 
Or controversy to satisfy limits on justiciability. 
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be to require certain disclosures of an insolvent business, even 
one allowed to conduct its affairs during arrangements (either 
as debtor in possession or through a receiver 45) or while in 
liquidation during bankruptcy.46 Such disclosures would inform 
the unsuspecting public of the business' insolvency. In the alter-
native, the court could require it to maintain deposits received 
during the time of insolvency separately in trust for the benefit 
of the consumers until delivery of the goods or services is com-
plete.47 While such an action will have no effect on monies already 
paid prior to the filing of the bankruptcy or chapter petition, 
it may effectively prevent consumer loss thereafter.48 
It should be noted that one problem with such an action, par-
ticularly during the pendency of an arrangement proceeding, is 
the exclusive, original jurisdiction vested in the Bankruptcy 
Court.49 Not only must the action be brought there, but in most 
cases, debtors apply for and receive stays from the institution or 
continuation of any other litigation against them in any other 
court.50 While such injunctions are clearly lawful, they often place 
the Bankruptcy Court in an untenable conflict. The Court's duty 
to preserve and enhance the bankrupt's estate may conflict with 
state law, particularly where the debtor's previous or proposed 
method of operation has been declared suspect by state enforce-
ment agencies.51 In addition to the difficult problem of balancing 
these often conflicting responsibilities, the Bankruptcy Court is 
45 See 11 U.S.C. § 732 and § 737. 
46 See 11 U.S.C. § 69. 
47 See In Be Land Auction Bureau and Auction Value Land Co. of Boston, Inc. 
for a case where such orders were entered by the court for the protection of the 
consuming pUblic. 
48 Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968) holds that the negligence of the 
receiver during a C. XI proceeding confers priority status on those harmed over 
other creditors. Such a holding might well be read to provide relief for consumers 
dealing with a C. XI company in good faith who nevertheless fail to receive their 
property or other bargained·for benefit. 
49 11 U.S.C. § 768 (1938). 
50 11 U.S.C. § 29 (H):)2). 
51 In Be Hillsdale Foundry Company, 2 Collier Bankruptcy Cases 546, (W.D. 
Mich., 1974). But see Memorandum and Order of Skinner, P. in In the Matter of 
Colonial Tavern, Inc. dha "Jacques". No. 76·0660·S, (D.Mass., petition filed Mar. 15, 
1976) dated JUly 21, 1976 holding that the purpose of the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Bankruptcy Court is not to interfere "in the comprehensive regulatory laws of 
a state." ld. at 3. 
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ill-equipped to consider issues of state regulation, particularly 
those involving public protection, i.e. consumer or environmental 
codes. The Court has none of the special expertise of state 
regulatory agencies nor is it appropriate to ask a commercial 
law judge to rule on questions of administrative review and 
agency discretion Many federal courts faced with the problem 
would properly abstain, but the Bankruptcy Court cannot do 
so in light of the grant of exclusive. original jurisdiction. At 
most, it can lift its injunctions against the pursuit of other 
actions. The sound exercise of comity indicates that it ought 
to do that, at least on application of a state law enforcement 
official seeking injunctive rather than monetary relief. 52 
5. Conclusion 
The remedies afforded the consumer through state law pro-
ceedings are limited. The questioned constitutionality of Uni-
form Commercial Code remedies, the limited nature of relief 
available under traditional state trust and equity theories, and 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court present seri-
ous obstacles to effective enforcement of state law during bank-
ruptcy to protect consumer creditors. Other remedies are clearly 
required. 
B. Relief Under the Bankruptcy Act 
One oft-cited policy behind the Bankruptcy Act is efficient 
liquidation and equitable distribution of a bankrupt's estate. 
To effect this policy, several provisions of the Act seek to undo 
the effects of fraudulent or overreaching behavior by the debtor 
Or his creditors. Thus the trustee is given the power to re-
cover preferential payments, to avoid fraudulent conveyances 
and to invalidate certain liens which have not been properly 
or seasonably perfected. It is frequently argued that these 
provisions strike a wise balance between the interest of all credi-
tors in maximizing the debtor'S estate and the individual inter-
ests of creditors who through foresight and diligence have 
52 Dh'ersa-Graphics, Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 194, (S.D.N.Y. 1976); 
Gonzalez HernaIHIl's \'. BUl'gos, 34::1 F. 2<1 iWZ (1st Cil'. 1!16,'); 111 Rf' Yigilalltl' Pro-
ter.th·e Systems, Illf, 333 F, Supp. I02!J (S.n.N.Y., 1971). 
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protected their claims. Since we are here urging greater pro-
tection for a certain class of creditors, i.e. consumers, it is 
necessary to consider carefully the limits of the existing pro-
visions which may work on their behalf. 
1. Preferential Payments 
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act53 allows the trustee to avoid 
preferential payments" made or suffered" by the debtor within 
four months of bankruptcy. Although this language is prob-
ably broad enough to include liens obtained by judicial process, 
Section 67 (a) of the Act54 provides specifically that any 
such lien obtained within four months of bankruptcy and while 
the debtor was insolvent55 is void as against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. To the extent that such preferential payments are 
avoided, the estate (and resulting distribution to creditors) 
would be increased. 
vVhere a voluntary payment is involved, the trustee must meet 
the stricter requirements of Section 60 in order to recover it.56 
In short, under Section 60, the trustee must show: 
1. That there has been a transfer to the creditor from the 
debtor within four months of bankruptcy,51 
2. That the transfer was for or on account of antecedent 
debt, 
3. That the transferor was insolvent at the time of the 
transfer, . 
4. That the transferee knew of the debtor's insolvency, 
and 
53 11 U.s.c. § 96 (1963). 
54 11 U.S.c. § 107(a) (1952). 
55 Or even if the debtor were not insolvent, where the lien was obtained or per· 
mitted with the intent of defrauding others, it will be void under § 67(a). See In 
the Matter of Warren Windle, 8 Colliers, Bierley. Cases, ,")6 (S.D.Fla., 1976). 
56 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1963). 
51 The time of the transfer is determined by the detailed rules set out in Section 
60. With respect to personal property, the basic rule is that the transfer is deemed 
made when it is perfected against third parties, in particular against a simple contract 
creditor levying on the property. With respect to real property, a bOrla fide purchaser 
test is used. 
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5. That the effect of the transfer was to allow the creditor 
to receive a greater percentage of his claim than other 
creditors of his class.58 
The aim of these provisions is to protect the rights of all 
creditors to receive distributions in bankruptcy. However, Sec-
tion 60 does not assure equitable treatment of all claimants, as 
it fails to provide a flexible scheme for simplifying pre-petition 
affairs of an insolvent debtor. The test under Section 60 is me-
chanical rather than equitable. The crucial question is not 
whether the creditor was unfairly preferred but whether the 
transfer took place within the four month period. 
2. Fraudulent Conveyances 
The trustee may attack a fraudulent conveyance under two 
separate sections of the Act. As with preferential payments, 
setting aside a fraudulent conveyance will increase the estate 
for the benefit of creditors. Section 67 (d) 59 provides that 
transfers which are fraudulent under its provisions are void 
as against the trustee. Section 70( e) 60 gives the trustee the 
rights possessed by any actual creditor of the bankrupt to 
attack a transaction under state law. \¥hen the transfer in 
question does not take place within the one year time period 
required in Section 67 (d) and the relevant state law of fraud-
ulent conveyances provides a more generous period, the trustee 
will proceed under this latter section. 
Whether the trustee pursues his remedies under the Bank-
ruptcy Act or under state law, he will be required to show 
that the transfer was either presumptively fraudulent or per-
petrated by the debtor with actual fraudulent intent. Under the 
law of most states (including those states which have passed 
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act) and under Section 
67(c), a transfer is presumptively fraudulent, i.e. fraudulent 
without regard to actual intent, if, 
58 11 U.s.C. § 96 (1963). 
59 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1952). 
60 11 U.S.C. § llO(e) (1952). 
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1. It is made without "fair consideration," and 
2. a) It leaves the debtor insolvent, or 
b) The debtor is about to do business for which the 
capital remaining in his hands is unreasonably small, 
or 
c) The debtor is about to incur debts beyond his ability 
to pay.61 
In this context, fair consideration means a fair equivalent 
exchanged in good faith and will include the satisfaction or 
securing of an antecedent debt.62 Arguably, a knowing preference 
is without fair consideration. For example, a debt may not be a 
fair equivalent if, by virtue of the debtor's financial position, 
it is worth a small fraction of its face value. Similarly, it could 
be argued that a knowing preference is neither taken nor given 
in good faith. But courts have uniformly rejected such argu-
ments and it is settled law that a mere preference without more 
will not constitute a fraudulent conveyance.63 
Where a transfer is not presumptively fraudulent (i.e. not 
made for a fair consideration) the trustee has the burden of 
showing that it was made with an actual fraudulent intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud other creditors. Once again a mere 
intent to prefer will not be sufficient.64 Even where the facts 
indicate that there has been more thap a simple preference, 
there may be several obstacles to the trustee's recovery. The 
first of these is the standard of proof he must meet. Although 
actual fraudulent intent can be shown by conduct or circum-
stantial evidence, there is some authority for the proposition 
that a mere preponderance of the evidence will not be enough 
and that fraud must be shown by clear and convincing proof.65 
Secondly, there is the problem of what will be considered 
an intent to "hinder, delay or defraud." In general, any 
61 See Bankruptcy Act, Section 67 (d) (11 U.S.C., ~ 107 (d» and Uniform Fraudu· 
lent Conveyanel) Act. 
62 Id. 
63Inderstine v. National Discount Company, 227 U.S. 575, 585. See also a recent 
Massachusetts case, Goldstein v. Columbia Diamond Ring Co., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
413. 
64 Id. 
65 Lackawana Pants Mfg. Co. v. Wiseman, 133 F. 2d 482 (6th Cir., 1943). 
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intent to deprive creditors of the benefits and protections of 
the Bankruptcy Act will suffice, but this approach has not 
been broadly applied. A recent case, In Re Cushman Bakery66 
illustrates an important limitation. In that case, the debtor 
had granted a security interest to one of his suppliers on 
account of an antecedent debt. The security interest was 
taken and filed by a third party, a wholly owned subsidiary 
of the creditor. Since the supplier was well known in the trade, 
the nominee was used to prevent other creditors of the debtor 
who saw the financing statement from becoming aware that the 
security interest had been given on account of antecedent debt. 
Here the debtor clearly participated in an attempt to prevent 
other creditors from placing the debtor in bankruptcy where 
the preferential transfer could be recovered by the trustee. The 
court found that this participation was not sufficient intent to 
invoke Section 67(d). It reasoned that Cushman, the debtor, 
had given the security in an honest attempt to rehabilitate its 
business for the benefit of all its creditors. The fact that it 
knew of and acquiesced in the creditor's concealment of the 
true nature of the transaction was considered "entirely con-
sistent with an intent to protect its creditor standing, to con-
tinue in business, and to rehabilitate itself financially." 67 
Thus it would appear that a debtor may intend to deprive 
creditors of the protection of the Act so long as this is incident 
to an honest attempt at saving his business. 
An additional obstacle to the trustee's recovery often arises 
where the transferee has the requisite fraudulent intent 
whereas the transferror does not.HS In a typical case, the debtor 
saves his business from certain bankruptcy by granting a pref-
erence or other advantage to one of his more insistent cred-
itors. The debtor in such a case intends no more than a pref-
erence, and an intent to prefer is clearly permissible. The credi-
66526 F. 2d 23 (1st Cir., 1975). 
67 526 F. 2d at 33. 
68 The transferee's intent is sometimes also relenlllt as where under the Uniform 
FraudUlent Conveyance Act., Reetion 9(:l) he attempts to obtain a lien on the property 
for the Ipss than full consideration paid. 
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tor, however, may have acted fraudulently in the manner of 
obtaining 01' concealing the preference. 
The dominant lender theory (or the Langan rule 69) is some-
times applied under such circumstances. In Langan, a bank 
held virtually all of a large series of bonds secured by a mort-
gage on the bankrupt's property. After default, it forced the 
debtor to cease operations and cancel its contracts. It then 
foreclosed and put the bankrupt's assets up for sale. The bank 
then formed a corporation to purchase the debtor's assets for 
a fraction of the value they would have commanded had the 
business been sold as a going concern. The New York Court of 
Appeals, in reviewing a summary judgment for the defendant 
bank, held that the evidence would support an inference of the 
bank's intent to defraud, and that if such intent were found, 
an action for fraudulent conveyance would lie.70 
A somewhat different situation arises where the debtor is 
aware of fraud in the transaction but is coerced into acquies-
cence. Such was the case in Mamtfacturer's Finance v. Marks.7l 
In that case, the chief creditor of the bankrupt not only ob-
tained a preferential assignment of the bankrupt's accounts 
receivable but also forced the bankrupt to place one of its 
agents on its payroll and to give him control over every aspect 
of the business. The court held that this was a fraudulent 
conveyance, saymg: 
While the officers of the Candy Company (the bankrupt) 
made this arrangement under coercion, they must be held to 
69 The rule arises from Langan v. First Frust and Deposit Co., 293 N.Y. 604, 
59 N.E. 2d 424 (1944). 
70 Under similar circumstances, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
adopted the Langan rule. In Citizen's Bank Rnd Trust Co. v. Rockingham Trailer 
Sales, Inc., 351 Mass. 457 (1966), the owner of a trailer park interfered with the 
sale of one of the trailers located in his park by insisting that the trailer be moved. 
The prospective purchaser was willing to pay $7,500 so long as he did not have to 
incur the considerable expense of moving the trailer. Two days before an attempted 
attachment and after the original deal had fallen through, the trailer park owner 
purchased the trailer for $2,391 antcceilent rleht and $609.00 cash. Later he resold 
the trailer for $6,500 without insisting that it be moyeil. Confronted with these 
facts, the court helil that the sale of the trailer was a fraudulent conveyance aml 
that the fair market ynlue of the trailer was recoverable by creditors without any 
credit to the trailer park owner for the eonsideration paid. 
71142 F. 2d 521 (1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 721 (1944). 
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have intended the obvious consequences of their act; and 
knowing the Candy Company's insolvent condition, to trans-
fer to appellant practically its only liquid asset and to give 
to appellant the entire control of its business would obviously 
hinder and delay its other creditors.72 
19 
These two cases illustrate that proof of actual intent on the 
part of the transferee will be a sufficient indication ef a fraud-
ulent conveyance if either the debtor is knowingly coerced 
into participating in fraudulent conduct without reasonable 
hope of saving his business or if the transferee actually asserts 
control over the debtor's business. But there are many cases 
where these doctrines do not apply. For example, in In Re 
Cushman Bakeries,13 the First Circuit held that the Langan 
rule could not be applied to a situation where the tenns of 
the preferential payment were negotiated between the parties 
at arms length even though the debtor had practically no bar-
gaining power as a result of his precarious financial position. 
In some cases, the fraudulent conveyance sections will work 
to prevent injustices. In the majority of cases, however, these 
sections are not well suited to protecting the claims of consumers 
from the pre-bankruptcy activities of professional lenders. Even 
in cases where the facts suggest that a. fraudulent conveyance 
has occurred, recovery may be impractical due to inadequate 
records maintained by the bankrupt and the high standard of 
proof rE}quired. 
3. Improperly perfected security interests 
Section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy AcF4 confers on the trustee 
the status of a levying creditor. As a result, the trustee can 
avoid all consensual liens which remain unperfected according 
to state law at the time of the petition.75 In addition, under Sec-
tion 70(e)16 the trustee may assert the rights of certain actual 
72 142 F. 2d at 524. 
73 See note 53, supra. 
7411 U.S.C. ~ 110 (a) (1952). 
175 If a security interest is not perfected until the period within four months of 
bankruptcy, it may be attacked as a preference under Section 60. See text accom-
panying notes 53-58, above. 
76 11 U.S.C. ~ 110(e) (1952). 
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creditors, e.g. gap creditors if any exist, to defeat a lien in its 
entirety for the benefit of the estate.77 Since these powers some-
times increase substantially the amount of the dividend paid 
to general creditors, some discussion of their role in insuring 
equitable treatment of all creditors is in order. 
In general, state law allows a creditor to take a security in-
terest or mortgage in almost every asset a debtor might possess. 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (covering security 
interests in personal property) and real estate recording stat-
utes (covering mortgages of real property) provide, with few 
exceptions, that such liens will not be effective against third 
parties unless certain steps are taken, e.g. filing, recording, or 
possession of collateral, to make them notorious. As a result, 
anyone who is considering extending credit will be able, with 
the exercise of some diligence, to discover what assets of the 
debtor are available for his repayment. 
Admittedly the availability of this sort of information is 
only helpful to a certain kind of creditor. Obviously, the filing 
system does not protect those creditors who have neither the 
sophistication nor the resources to use it. What is surprising is 
that the system does not really aid anyone at all except a 
potential secured creditor. The Cushman case discussed above 
illustrates this point. In Cushman, the trustee argued that 
though there had been technical compliance with the per-
fection provisions of Article 9, the security interest was 
nonetheless invalid because, through the use of a nominee, the 
creditor had obscured the true nature of the transaction. The 
court rejected this argument and held that a security interest 
is good against third parties if a financing statement has been 
filed which meets all of the express requirements of Article 9. 
In so holding, the court reasoned that Maine's system of notice 
filing was not intended to insure public notice of the true nature 
of a transaction but was merely intended to make creditors and 
potential creditors aware that a third party may have a prior 
claim on a certain part of the debtor's assets. With the co-
operation of the debtor, further inquiry may be made under 
77 Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, (1931). 
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Section 9-208 of the Uniform Commercial Code. But this sec-
tion only compel·s the secured creditor to disclose the exact 
amount of his claim and the specific collateral covered by his 
security agreement. This disclosure is clearly not sufficient 
for a lender who wishes to make an intelligent decision about 
extending credit. The reliability of any other information 
he possesses will usually depend upon the honesty of the debtor. 
On the other hand, the statutory requirements fully protect a 
lender who is able to obtain a security interest in the debtor's 
remaining assets. 
The above-discussed provisions can work for the consumer 
creditor's benefit. As unsecured creditors of the debtor they 
become non-priority claimants and are entitled to a share of 
the debtor's estate. Once priority claims are paid, the size of 
their dividend will be increased by any recovery obtained by 
the trustee. But it is important not to confuse procedures 
which may benefit consumer creditors with those which would 
actually protect them. The precariousness of a consumer's 
position does not depend upon actual fraudulent conduct 
or inadequacy of filed notice. The four month period during 
which preferences are voidable is too short if a creditor is able 
to keep the debtor's business operating by supplying him with 
secured credit. These provisions are designed to protect credi-
tors who are aware of their status as such and who routinely 
exercise their own judgment in making credit decisions. Better 
treatment of consumer claimants in bankruptcy should not be 
thought unnecessary merely because they are occasionally fortu-
nate enough to receive a benefit at the expense of a secured 
creditor. 
III. LEGISLATIVE REFORM ATTEMPTS AT THE 
STATE LEVEL 
As judicial relief is insufficient to protect consumer creditors 
in bankruptcy, legislative reform should be explored. In this 
section, the constitutional and statutory limits on state legisla-
tive attempts to help consumers collect their claims after bank-
ruptcy will be explored. The authors believe, in view of these 
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limits on state action, that the only fair and reasonably efficient 
resolution of the problem lies with Congress. 
A. Limitations on state power to act 
The Bankruptcy Act sharply limits the states' power to act 
in this field. Priorities in distribution are specified in Section 
64(a) of the Act.78 The only state-created priority it recog-
nizes is a priority for partial payment of the bankrupt's land-
lord.79 The federal priority scheme has been held to preempt 
the field80 and thus state-created priorities are invalid under 
Congress' Article I power to create uniform laws in bank-
ruptcy81 and the Supremacy Clause.82 
B. State-created trusts 
To overcome this problem, several states have adopted legisla-
tion designed to prevent advance deposits from ever entering 
the bankrupt's estate. A typical approach is to provide by stat-
ute that the funds so collected shall be kept in trust for the 
benefit of the purchaser (i.e. consumer). Thus, New York has 
adopted a law which requires landlords83 and lessors of per-
sonal property84 to keep security deposits segregated from their 
own funds. When these deposits are placed in a bank account 
they must designate that account as a trust account naming 
the lessees as beneficiaries. The lessor must also notify each 
beneficiary of the name of the bank where the account is kept 
and the amount held in trust on his/her behalf. Failure to com-
ply with the the statute subjects the landlord to liability to the 
tenant for converting his deposit85 and to criminal penalties.86 
78 11 U.S.C. 9 104(a) (1967). 
79 The fifth priority in Section 64 (a) includes a state-created priority for rent 
to the extent that it represents rent due for occupancy within three months of 
bankruptcy. 
80 Elliott v. Bump, 356 F. 2d 749 (9th Cir., 1966). 
81 U.S. CONST., Art. I, Section 8. 
82 U.S. CONST., Art. IV. 
83 N.Y_ GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW, 9 7-103. 
84 N.Y. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW, 9 7-10l. 
85 See Ferguson v. Vaughn Motors, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 884, 9 Misc. 2d 884, (1957). 
86N.Y. PENAL LAW, 9 1302(a). 
1976] MAKING BANJ(RUPTCY WORK 23 
Where the landlord has placed the money in a separate trust 
account, rights in the account do not pass to a bankruptcy 
trustee 87 The result is less fortunate, however, in the common 
situation where an insolvent debtor has simply ignored the law. 
Where this occurs the tenants will prevail only in a rare case 
where they can trace their money into current assets of the 
debtor.88 Where non-compliance is only discovered when the 
landlord goes bankrupt, the penalties for noncompliance are 
little comfort to his tenants. Their action for conversion is most 
likely worthless and the criminal penalties, if they are even im-
posed, do not affect their loss. 
California apparently recognized this problem in drafting a 
similar statute. Under their financial code89 certain businesses 
which sell money orders are required to keep the funds received 
for such money orders segregated in a trust account until they 
are disbursed in payment of the instrument. If the business 
fails to do this, the statute imposes a trust on all the business 
assets for the benefit of people holding the checks.90 Unfortu-
nately, this latter section will not be enforced in bankruptcy. 
Thus, in Elliot v. Bump91 the debtor had kept some of his re-
ceipts segregated but mingled others with his own funds. The 
beneficiary of the trust claimed both the ·trust fund and, under 
the statute, all assets of the debtor at the time of bankruptcy. 
The court decided that the claimant was entitled to the trust 
funds since these did not pass to the trustee under Section 
70(a)92, but not to any priority in the remaining assets. In so 
87 Under Section 70(a) (11 U.S.C. ~ 1l0(a)) the trustee receives title to all 
the debtor'~ property including" powers whirh he might have exercised for his own 
benefit but not those which he might ha'-e exercised solely for some other person." 
Since the state trust stntute prohihits him from acquiring any beneficinl interest in the 
trust accounts, title to those accounts will not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. 
88 Tracing is made nearly impossible by several factors. Often, the bankrupt busi-
ness has either not kept or not turned over to th, trustee vcry complete records. 
Where the deposit has been paid several months cnrlier it is unlikely that it will be 
traced to some current asset of the hankrupt. For a thorough discussion of the 
problems of tracing in bankruptcy see Schrag and Ratner, Supra note 15 at 
Sllpra note 33 at 438. 
89 CALIF. FINAN. CODE, 12300.3. 
90 Id. 
Ol See note 80, Sllpra. 
92 11 U.S.C. ~ 110(a) (19;'2). 
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deciding, it held that the statutory attempt to impose a trust 
on all the debtor's property without any tracing requirement 
was nothing more than a state-created priority and, as such, 
wholly invalid against a trustee in bankruptcy. 
C. State-created liens 
Another way for the state to protect prepaying consumers 
would be to give them a lien on certain of the debtor's assets 
as security for their claims. If a valid statutory lien is created, 
it has the advantage of being both effective in bankruptcy93 and 
not voidable as a preference even if it comes into existence 
within four months of bankruptcy.94 Under Section 67, a stat-
utory lien is valid against the trustee unless 1) it first comes 
into operation upon the debtor's insolvency95 or 2) it is a lien 
for rent.96 Additionally, at the time of bankruptcy the lien 
must be enforceable against a bona fide purchaser or the lien-
holder must be able to so perfect under the applicable state 
statute.97 Since most liens may be perfected against bona fide 
purchasers by taking possession and since the second proviso 
to Section 67(c) (1) (B)98 allows the lienor to take possession by 
filing a notice with the Bankruptcy Court, invalidity of a lien 
under this section is very rare.99 
Thus, under Section 67 (c) 100 it would appear that a lien of 
the following sort would be operative in bankruptcy. 
93 11 U.S.C. 9 107(b) (1966). 
941d. 
95 11 U.S.C. g107(e)(1)(A) (1966). 
96 11 U.S.C. 9 107(e) (1) (C) (1966). 
97 11 U.S.C. 9 107(c) (1) (B) (1966)C. 
981d. 
99 In commenting on Seetion 67(c)(1)(B), the Commission said that this see-
tion "invalidates liens on ambulatory houses in Pennsylvania, the get of bulls, 
rams and boars in Colorado and vendors' liens in Puerto Rieo." Report of the 
Commissivn on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, July, 1973, Part II, See-
tion 4-606. Note 1 (b). Indeed this seetion has been randomly applied. In Re 
.7. R. Nieves and Compan)/, 446 F. 2d 18'l (CA 1. 1971). See also, Statutory Liens 
in Bankruptcy, 39 MINN. L. REV. 697 (1955) and Note: A Bona Fide Purchaser Test 
Plus for Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy, 50 N.C.L. REV. 90 (1971). 
100 11 U.S.C. § 107 (c) (1966). 
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Whenever a person codtracts to purchase property or services 
for his own personal, .family or household use from a busi-
ness in this state and prepays for such property or service, 
he shall have a lien on all the assets of the business to secure 
performance of his contract. 
25 
Even though this lien does not fall within any of the exceptions 
in Section 67 (c), there is still a major problem with this ap-
proach. A lien is not necessarily invulnerable to the charge 
of being a mere priority. Under federal case law, the line be-
tween a valid lien and a mere priority is less than clear.101 At 
a bare minimum it would seem necessary that a lien convey some 
pre-bankruptcy enforcement rights. If such rights are accorded 
in a substantial enough fashion to defeat the charge of mere 
priority, a large element of uncertainty will be interjected into 
lending transactions. 
Traditional statutory liens, such as mechanics' liens or ware-
housemen's liens tend to apply only to specific property which 
is related to the underlying transaction. The exception, of course, 
is tax liens. The federal tax lienl02, for example, extends to 
"all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, 
belonging to such person." This lien is subordinate to prior 
choate interests in the debtor's property and filing is required 
to make it effective against third parties acquiring interests in 
the taxpayers property. Despite this fact, the lien has caused 
considerable worry and uncertainty among secured lenders.l03 
Confusion would be even greater where a filing requirement 
would be impractical and the amount of potential liability is 
difficult to ascertain. Thus, even if it is possible for a state 
to create a consumer lien effective in bankruptcy (an assumption 
101 The old Uniform Trust Heceipts Act provided for a priority in and lien on 
the proceeds from collateral ohtained within ten days of liquidation proceedings. 
The cases split upon the validit.y of this section in hankruptcy proceedings. See 
In Re Harpeth Motors, 135 F. Supp. 863, (M.D. Tenn., 1955) and In Re Crosstown 
Motors, Inc. 272 }'. 2d 224, (CA 7, 1959). In Harpeth the court held that the lien 
was valid and in so holding emphasized the fact that the section conveyed certain 
pre-bankruptcy rights such as the right to demand an accounting. 
102 26 U.S.C. ~ 6321 (1954). 
loa See, e.g., Gamble, "Secured Transactions: The Perfected Security Interest 
versus Competing Cla.ims," fi Cumber-San. L. Hev. ] ·29 (1970); Lacy, "Effect 
of Federal Priority and Tax Lien Legislation on Creditors of Vendors and Pur-
chasers," 50 Ore. L. Rev. 621 (1971). 
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concerning which we have some doubt) it can do so only at 
an enormous cost in terms of uncertainty and complexity. A 
priority in payment upon insolvency is precisely what is wanted. 
What is not wanted are pre-bankruptcy remedies which place 
the debtor's affairs in a state of confusion. 
D. Personal Liability of Corporate Managers 
Another strategy for protecting consumers from business 
insolvency is illustrated by a ·Wisconsin statute. Under Wis-
consin's Consumer Acp°4, a consumer who obtains a judgment 
for violations of the act and is unable to collect from an incorpo-
rated business by reason of its insolvency may proceed against 
the principals105 of that corporation providing that it can be 
shown that they knew or should have known of the violations 
and that the violations were a meaningful part of the corpora-
tion's business. 
Such a statute not only gives consumers a remedy when a 
business becomes insolvent but also provides ample incentive 
for corporate managers to comply with consumer laws. Never-
theless in the absence of violations it does not protect consumers 
where the business is simply unable to deliver by reason of 
insolvency, nor are consumer creditors protected in the com-
mon case where the principals of a bankrupt corporation are 
also insolvent. Thus, while it is hoped that more states will 
make such provisions a part of their consumer law, these pro-
visions are far too limited in scope for the consumer's purposes. 
E. Priority over Secured Lenders 
The final posibility for legislative reform at the state level 
is the amendment of Article 9 of the commercial code. Accord-
ingly, the claims of consumer creditors could be given priority 
over security interests created under Article 9. Under current 
bankruptcy law, however, the effect of such a provision would be 
far too extreme because all security interests created by the 
104 WISCONSIN LAWS, ~ 425.310. 
105 Including but not limited to officers of the corporation, its managers and 
assistant managers. 
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debtor would be invalidated whellever there is a single consumer 
creditor on the date of bankruptcy. ThQ reason for this is that 
Section 70 (e) 106 gives the trustee the power to set aside any trans-
fer which could have been avoided by some actual creditor of the 
bankrupt. Thus since any security interest would not be good 
in the face of a consumer claim, the trustee may stand in the 
shoes of any actual creditor and recover the secured assets. 
Furthermore, in Moore v. Bay107, the Supreme Court held that 
the trustee's recovery was not for the benefit of the creditor 
whose rights were used but for the benefit of the entire estate 
and that the size of the trustee's recovery would not be limited 
by the amount of the intervening claim. Thus every security 
interest granted by the bankrupt would be vulnerable to attack 
even if there is only one consumer creditor with a ten dollar 
claim. 
Even if a state could lawfully enact legislation and limit its 
applicability to the size of the priority claims, the wisdom of 
such legislation is questionable. Lending today is truly an inter-
state activity. Uniformity in state commercial law promotes 
availability of credit in all markets and facilitates interstate 
borrowings. If the federal government does not amend the 
Bankruptcy Act to improve the lot of .consumers each state 
will be faced with the harsh dilemma of the need to protect 
consumers on the one hand and the possibility of frightening 
away important sources of credit for its businesses and con-
sumers on the other hand. 
F. Conclusion 
It is clear that certain remedies are available to a willing state 
to protect its consumers in the event of bankruptcy. Because 
of the current law's prohibition against liens effective only upon 
insolvency, preferential transfers, and the difficulty of enforcing 
state created liens, it is necessary for a consumer-oriented state 
to enact generally effective liens for the benefit of consumers 
in order to act constitutionally as well as effectively for con-
106n U.S.C. 9 llO(e) (19fi2). 
107 284 U.S. 4. 
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sumer creditors. Any lesser remedy will fail because it will 
not reach the largest portion of most commercial debt-
ors' property. But generally effective, consumer-benefit liens 
on a state-by-state basis will insert a new element of uncer-
tainty into lending transactions which does not seem desir-
able. Any business acting across state lines will have to assure 
its lenders that they are protected or secured before it will be 
able to obtain financing. Such assurances could not be given 
where a state in which the business proposed to operate 
had granted the consumer lien described above. This infirmity 
would be resolved, of course, if Congress made such a lien 
federal, limited its operation to bankruptcy proceedings, and 
clearly specified the conditions on which it could become ef-
fective. 
Other infirmities exist, however, with state-created consumer 
liens effective upon bankruptcy even if allowed by Federal law. A 
tenant with a security deposit claim in the amount of $200 
takes a lien which is superior to the mortgages on the property. 
If filing is required to give notice, most tenants will fail to do 
so and no protection will result. If filing is not required, the 
mortgagee is not given adequate notice that this security is 
imperfect or may so become. Even if perfected, however, the 
effort and cost attendant to enforcement of the lien against 
the estate hardly justify the consumer's time. Foreclosing on 
a building for the payment of a $200 debt hardly seems an 
intelligent or efficient way of giving protection to consumers. 
Similar filing and notice arguments exist with regard to other 
liens which may secure consumer deposits on or purchases of 
as-of-yet undelivered goods. 
It is possible to design state-created liens for the protec-
tion of consumer creditors. But they engender more prob-
lems in their operation and enforcement than they seem to cure. 
Vve reject this approach. If Congress will permit states to 
create liens for the benefit of their consumers, Congress should 
be equally willing to do the job itself and make the solution 
truly effective. By making protection of consumer claims part 
of the federal bankruptcy scheme, Congress can provide the 
desired uniformity, allow for off-setting benefits to secured 
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lenders who lose their collate'ral to consumers, and enact an 
efficient procedure for the ptoof and payment of consumer 
claims. We have suggested below one possible direction Con-
gress might take in accomplishing these results. 
IV. REWRITING THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT To PROTECT 
CONSUMER CREDITORS 
In 1970, Congress created the National Commission on the 
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. lOS The purpose of the 
Commission was to study the Bankruptcy Act, review the 
problems which had arisen under it, and to suggest changes to 
the Congress. The report of the Commission was issued in two-
part form in July, 1973.109 Part I contains findings regarding 
the operation of the current law and Part II contains the pro-
posal for a new bankruptcy law.110 Because the Commission 
largely de-emphasized the role of the judge and the private 
trustee in bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy judges filed 
their own bill,1l1 tracking the form of the Commission bill but 
substantially altering it. The Commission bill de-emphasizes 
the role of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Judge's Bill, as ex-
pected, does not. A third bill has also been proposed 112 by the 
National Bankruptcy Conference and all three are before the 
House and Senate for consideration.l13 
The Commission bill makes some significant changes· in the 
areas discussed above. The preference sections, for example, 
have been completely revised. Under proposed Section 4-607 
the trustee may recover any preferential payment made while 
the debtor was insolvent and within three months of bank-
lOS PL 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). 
109 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
110 Known as H.R. 31 in the House of Representatives and S.236 in the Senate. 
III Known as H.R. 32 in the House of Representatives and S.235 in the Senate. 
112 In the form of 200 amendments to HR 31, submitted in March, 1976 informally 
to the House Subcommittee on Personal and Constitutional Rights. 
113 In the House they are before the Subcommittee on Personal and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House JUdiciary Committee; in the Senate they are before the 
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary. 
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ruptcy whether or not the transferee knew of the debtor's 
insolvency. In certain cases, however, the preferential period 
will extend for a full year prior to the petition. This occurs 
where, "the (preferred) creditor was a member of the imme-
diate family, a partner, an affiliate, a director, an officer or a 
managing agent of or for the debtor, who had reasonable cause 
to believe the debtor was insolvent at the date the transfer 
occurred." 114 Thus the new act distinguishes between creditors 
who are outsiders and creditors who are insiders and greatly 
reduces a debtor's ability to prefer the latter. This distinction 
will increase the trustee's power to recover payments to major 
creditors who have exercised control over the debtor's business 
if the courts will broadly construe such terms as "affiliate" 
and "managing agent." 115 
HR 31 also changes the rules governing enforceability of 
state statutory liens in bankruptcy. As discussed above,116 the 
current law makes such liens enforceable with only a few ex-
ceptions. Under the proposed act, no statutory liens will be 
recognized, except: 
1) (L)iens which secure a debt for manufacture, repaIr or 
storage of an article; 117 
2) certain tax liens; and 
3) liens which secure an assessment against the property for 
the cost of a public improvement.lIs 
Thus if the new act were passed as written the trustee could 
avoid any lien created by the state on behalf of prepaying 
consumers. 
114 Section 4-607 (a) (2) of H.R. 31. 
115 Under the new act, "Affiliate" is a defined term. See H.R. 31, Section 
1-102 (4). This definition includes parent, sub and sister corporations as affiliates. 
In addition, two persons will be affiliates where one "operates under a lease or 
operating agreement substantially all of the property" of the other. Section 
1-102 (4). 
116 See discussion accompanying notes 93-103 Supra. 
117 This exception covers a mechanic's lien, a bailee's lien, a warehouseman's 
lien, etc. 
118 H.R. 31, Section 4-606. 
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The proposed act does, however, overrule the problem creat-
ed by Moore v. BayY9 Section 4-604 (b) (1) of H.R. 31 pro-
vides: 
Any transfer of the debtor's property and any obligation 
incurred by the debtor which is voidable under applicable 
law by any creditor or creditors having claims allowable in 
a chapter V case is voidable by the trustee to the extent of 
S1lch allowable claim or claims for the benefit of s7wh creditor 
or creditors. (emphasis supplied) 
Thus if a state amended its commercial code by making Article 
9 security interests ineffective against consumer creditors, the 
trustee would be able to use this state limitation on the rights 
of secured parties to recover f"om the secured creditors enough 
of their collateral to pay consumer claims. 
Finally, it should be noted that the new act continues to pre-
empt the field of payment priorities to the detriment of con-
sumers.120 The Hon. Millicent Fenwiek (R.-N.J.) attempted to 
change this by filing an amendment to the Commission bill 
which would improve the status of consumers by creating a 
preferential class for them in the priority list.l21 That bill has 
died in committee for lack of support. The authors believe that 
the Fenwick Amendment is a step in the right direction but 
we also urge that a more comprehensive approach for protec-
ting consumer interests be considered. 
What follows, then, are the suggestions of the authors for 
amendments to HR 31 which accomplish substantial justice for 
consumer creditors without doing substantial violence to se-
cured interests or otherwise upsetting traditional notions of an 
insolvent business' duty to its creditors. These suggestions 
have been presented to the National Association of Attorneys 
General by Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti of Massachu-
setts. They provide four areas of revision favorable to consumers: 
1) creation of a limited consumer lien; 2) creation ofa limited 
119 See note 107 Supra. 
120 H.R. 31, Section 4·405 provides for the following priorities: 1) administrative 
expenses; 2) certain claims arising between the filing of an involuntary petition 
and adjudication; 3) certain wage claims; 4) certain employee benefit claims; 
5) certain tax claims. 
121 HR 8336. 
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consumer priority; 3) provision for enforcement of state law dur-
ing bankruptcy proceedings in the public interest and 4) pro-
cedural amendments allowing state Attorneys General to inter-
vene in bankruptcy proceedings on behalf of classes of consumer 
creditors. Each has essentially different functions but all have 
the same goal. A short commentary follows each proposal. 
PROPOSED LIEN FOR CERTAIN CONSUMER CREDITORS 
It is suggested that the new Bankruptcy Act (HR 31) be 
amended as follows: 
After section 4-402, insert: 
Section 4-403 Lien for Certain Consumer Creditors-If a 
consumer creditor has paid money or other property to the 
debtor in connection with a contract for the sale or lease of 
property or services and the contract has not been substan-
tially performed, then such consumer creditor shall have 
1) a lien upon the property which is the subject 
matter of such lease or contract which lien shall be 
superior to all other liens on the property; and 
2) a lien upon any property in possession of the 
debtor at the time of bankruptcy which is not 
available for distribution to general creditors 
solely by reason of a lien held by a creditor (whose 
claim is not subordinated under ~ 4-406 (a)) in 
such property who possesses liens, effective in 
bankruptcy, on more than fifty (50) percent in 
value of the assets in possession of the debtor at 
the time of the petition, such lien to be superior 
to the rights of such creditor; PROVIDED 
THA T such lien shall only arise to the extent 
that property which is the subject matter of the 
contract is not sufficiently identified by the con-
tract or by circumstances for a lien to attach under 
paragraph (1) or, though identified, is insufficient 
in value to satisfy the purchaser's or lessee's claim 
which arises under this section, 
for the recovery of any unearned portion of the purchase 
price, security deposit or rent which the purchaser or lessee 
has paid. Such liens shall not be voidable by the trustee 
under 4-606 or 4-607. 
Renumber ~ 4-403 - ~ 4-406 as § 4-404 - ~ 4-407 accordingly. 
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This subsection allows a consumer creditor who has made 
part or full payment to the debtor on a lease or purchase 
contract to get priority over certain secured creditors (and 
consequently over unsecured creditors) for the amount of his 
payment when that contract or lease remains unperformed 
because of the seller's or lessor's bankruptcy. 
The lien given in paragraph 1 gives the consumer creditor 
first priority in the property which is the subject matter of 
his contract. Thus, for example, if the consumer has paid a 
$500 deposit on a car which is, upon bankruptcy, part of the 
dealer's inventory, his claim of $500 must be paid before the 
inventory lender may foreclose on his security. Similarly, one 
who has paid a security deposit on a residential apartment 
must be repaid from the proceeds of sale of the building before 
the mortgagee. 
The lien given in paragraph (2) allows the consumer to have 
first priority on certain of the debtor's assets which are subject 
to liens. Any creditor who has a security interest covering 
fifty (50) percent of the debtor's as.,;ets at the time of bank-
ruptcy will find that his interest in the security is subordinated 
to the claims of consumer creditors under this section. In 
determining whether a creditor's lien is subordinated under 
this section, an asset does not count as being covered by that 
creditor's lien if his lien is for any reason voidable by the 
trustee. On the other hand, an asset should be considered 
covered by the lien of a particular creditor whether or not 
there is another creditor who has a lien on that asset and even 
if the other lien has priority. 
EXAMPLE 1: Creditor 1 has taken a security interest 
in Debtor's inventory, equipment, accounts receivable, etc. 
Creditor 2 has a properly filed purchase money security inter-
est in one piece of the Debtor's equipment. The value of that 
piece of equipment must be taken into account in determining 
whether Creditor 1 has secured fifty (50) percent of Debtor's 
assets. Nevertheless, the consumer does not have a lien on that 
piece of equipment since its unavailability for distribution to 
general creditors is not solely by virtue of Creditor 1 's interest. 
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EXAMPLE 2: If Creditor 1 has a security interest in a 
given piece of collateral but is not secured by more than fifty 
(50) percent of the debtor's assets and if Creditor 2 has a 
priority purchase money security interest in the same piece 
of collateral and is secured by more than fifty (50) percent of 
the debtor's assets, a problem of circular priorities is pre-
sented. The interest of the ,consumer is superior to that of 
Creditor 2 under §4-602 (e). Creditor 2's interest is superior 
to that of Creditor 1 under state commercial law (UCC §9-312). 
And finally, Creditor 1's interest is superior to the consumer's 
by virtue of his perfected security interest. This issue should 
be resolved by deciding that since Creditor 1 has no enforce-
able interest in the collateral (because of Creditor 2's pri-
ority), the property is not available for distribution "solely 
by reason of" Creditor 2's security interest. Thus the order of 
distribution of the collateral would be: 1) Consumer; 2) Cred-
itor 2; and 3) Creditor 1. 
The proviso contained in paragraph (2) aims solely at. mak-
ing it plain that a consumer acting under this section must 
first seek to satisfy his claim by taking advantage of the lien 
in paragraph (1) before proceeding under paragraph (2). 
The ability of a creditor under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, Article 9, to take a security interest in nearly every asset 
possessed by the debtor means in certain cases that consumer 
creditors will not be paid in bankruptcy regardless of the 
priority given to their claims. While it is probably unwise for 
the Bankruptcy Act to interfere indiscriminately with security 
interests created under state law, certain equitable considera-
tions make it desirable to give the consumer a few well defined 
rights against secured creditors. Briefly these considerations 
are: 
1) Bargaining Power. The rights of creditors in bankruptcy 
are determined to a large extent by negotiations with the 
debtor prior to his insolvency. A creditor who advances money 
or goods with expectations of repayment will usually have 
much greater bargaining power with the debtor than a con-
sumer who advances a smaller sum in exchange for future 
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delivery of goods or services. In a typical situation, whatever 
small bargaining power the consumer has is not exercised 
because of his ignorance that these pre-bankruptcy negotia-
tions will determine his share in the event of liquidation. 
2) A Consumer's Lack of Intent to Become a Creditor. 
Closely related to the above is the fact that a consumer typi-
cally makes no conscious decision to become a creditor of the 
seller. Even if the consumer did suspect that such was the 
case, he does not possess and probably would not be able to 
acquire any of the information which would normally be con-
sidered relevant in deciding to make a loan. 
3) Other Creditors are Compensated for Their Risk. While 
professional lenders extract either interest or other conces-
sions for extending credit, the consumer often does not pay 
less for the desired items because he has contracted to pay 
in advance. 
Outweighing these considerations is the burden placed 
on business financing if a creditor's interest in his security is 
subject to potentially large liabilities the amount of which he 
is unable to estimate. Thus, the aim of this subsection is to 
provide remedies for the consumer which can, as a practical 
matter, be noted by secured creditors. For this reason, the 
consumer lien created only arises with respect to a certain 
class of consumer claims, i.e. those which are for repayment 
of amounts paid to the debtor in connection with unperformed 
contracts. The amount of such claims at any given time will 
be a definite sum, and the total potential liability under this 
section is readily calculable by interested creditors with the 
cooperation of the debtor. In addition, the lien only affects the 
interests of certain creditors. The mortgagee of a residential 
apartment building, the inventory financier of a retail seller, 
and the major creditor of any particular debtor will have 
reason to consider potential claims under this subsection. The 
interests of other creditors, e.g. suppliers and other minor 
lenders, are not affected. Secured creditors of a large number 
of businesses which do not ordinarily do business with con-
sumers also remain unaffected. 
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The secured creditor whose rights are affected should be 
able to estimate the potential liability arising under this section 
and to protect himself in various ways. 
Mortgagees of Leased Residential Buildings. Under this sec-
tion, mortgages of residential property will be subordinated to 
claims for return of security deposits and unearned rent. The 
potential liability can be easily calculated by an inspection of 
outstanding leases. Since the terms of outstanding leases are 
frequently a major determinant of the value of a rented build-
ing such leases are usually available in connection with the 
sale or mortgage of a building. In cases where apartments 
are let on a month to month basis pursuant to an oral agree-
ment, a prudent lender might require a statement from each 
of the tenants of the amount of any security deposit he has 
paid. Since oral rental agreements are usually found where 
the building contains only a few apartments, such a require-
ment would not be unduly burdensome. 
Once the amount of the outstanding deposits is known, the 
mortg;:tgee can protect himself in one of two ways. On the one 
hand, he could require the debtor as a condition of his mortgage 
to place all tenant security deposits in a special bank account 
and to grant him a security interest in that account. By per-
fecting this security interest in accordance with Article 9 of 
the U.C.C., he is assured of alternative security which will 
offset the amount subtracted from the proceeds of the mort-
gaged property by reason of the lien given in ~4-403.122 Alter-
natively, he could require the debtor to place all tenant secur-
ity deposits in a trust account which would name the tenants 
as beneficiaries. If this is done, the money in the account would 
not become property of the bankruptcy estate under ~4-601123 
122 This section makes use of the definition of "consumer creditor" proposed 
at p. 52 infra. 
123 Section 4·601(a)(1) provides that "all property of the debtor as of the 
date of the petition" is property of the estate. A bank account to which the 
debtor has nominal title as trustee but which is subject to a trust for the benefit 
of third parties is not, by established principles, "property of the debtor" for 
bankruptcy purposes. Deposits to this account within three months of bankruptcy 
will not be voidable as preferences at least so long as the leases pursuant to which 
security deposits are paid require that the deposit be held in trust for ilie tenant. 
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and would be available for refunds of security deposits. Since 
the tenants' claims against the debtor would be extinguished 
by payment from this account, the mortgagee will receive the 
full benefit of his mortgage. 
It is of course possible that a mortgagee will take neither 
of these steps to protect his mortgage. Whether he does so or 
not will depend on a number of factors including his estimate 
of the likelihood of the debtor becoming insolvent and the 
size of the potential liability as compared with the value of 
the security less the amount of the loan. 
Inventory Lenders. When there are consumer creditors who 
have contracted to purchase goods from the debtor, the security 
interest of the inventory lender will be vulnerable under this 
section. Under existing state law a creditor's security interest 
in a debtor's inventory is subject to certain perils. Under 
U.C.C., §9-307 (1) his security interest in a given piece of 
merchandise may be defeated by one who buys the merchan-
dise in the ordinary course of the debtor's business. Thus, 
where a sale is completed and title is transferred under normal 
business conditions/24 the inventory lender loses his interest 
in the item sold and gains under section 9~306 (2) an interest 
in "identifiable proceeds" of the sale. It is necessary then for 
the lender if he/she is to keep his loan maximally secured to 
police his/her collateral by requiring the debtor to keep the pro-
ceeds of the sale in identifiable form until the portion of the 
loan secured by the sold collateral is repaid. 
An inventory lender could protect itself in a similar fash-
ion from the lien given in paragraph (1) of proposed section 
4-403. A down payment on merchandise pursuant to a contract 
of sale should be considered" proceeds" within the definition 
124 At first glance, one might think that the buyer's protection under U.C.C. 
§ 9-307 extends to buyers who have contracted to buy but not completed a sale. 
This view is especially plausible in light of the definition of "buyer" contained in 
Section 2-103(1)(a) as a "person who buys or contracts to buy goods." Unfortu· 
nately, the definition of "buyer in the ordinary course of business" (Section 
1-201[9]) precludes such an interpretation, The reference in" the definition to 
"the sale to him" is strongly suggestive that to be a buyer in the ordinary course, 
one must have obtained title by a complete sale. 
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of §9-306(1).125 All the inventory lender need do then to avail 
himself of the protection of §9-306(2) and (3) is to be sure that 
proceeds are covered in his original financing statement and 
to require the debtor to keep such down payments in identifi-
able form. A separate security agreement or the kind of trust 
recommended above for mortgagees will not be necessary in 
this instance. Thus, the burden of poli~ing collateral imposed 
on inventory lenders by proposed section 4-403 is not markedly 
different from that that they already bear under prevailing 
state commercial law. 
Before considering the lien given in paragraph (2), it should 
be noted that the lien of paragraph (1) overlaps to some 
extent with that given in §4-602(d). Under §4-602(d), a pur-
chaser whose executory contract to buy property is rejected 
by the trustee gets a lien on the property for the recovery of 
the portion of the purchase price he has paid. This lien is 
available both to commercial and consumer purchasers. Al-
though a consumer purchaser may have a remedy und~r 
§4-602(d), this remedy is limited by the fa~t that the §4-602(d) 
lien only extends to the debtor's interest in the property.126 
Thus, where there is an outstanding security interest in that 
asset, the consumer's only effective remedy would be to pro-
ceed under proposed section 4-403. 
Major Secured Creditor's of the Debtor. Frequently a busi-
ness has one major creditor with which it participates in an 
on-going and close relationship. Typically this creditor has a 
security interest in the majority of the debtor's assets. In 
such cases, the secured creditor is likely to have notice that 
there are potential claims whi~h will under section 4-403 sub-
ordinate his security interest and, in view of the debtor's 
dependency on his continuing advances, is likely to have suf-
125 U.C.C. 9 9·306 (1) states "proceeds" include "whatever is received when 
collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of." Though 
there has not been a sale, a portion of the collateral has been otherwise disposed of. 
126 The 9 4-602 (d) lien is further limited by the fact that it arises only in con-
nection with executory contracts. A contract which has been fully performed by 
the consumer buyer but not by the seller may not be executory under this section. 
See Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankr1Lptcy, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439 (1973). 
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ficient bargaining power to minimize the effect of section 4-403 
upon his lien. The prudent lender will require the debtor 
either to place the consumer deposit in a special account as 
discussed above or to reinvest the proceeds in assets covered 
by his security agreement. In this way, the lender can protect 
himself from any dimunition in the value of his collateral as a 
result of the priority given the consumer's lien. On the other 
hand, it should be noted that the proposed lien does prevent 
the collateral of the secured lender from being increased by 
virtue of the consumer's unreturned deposit. 
If it is thought wise to make notice an explicit requirement 
for the lien to arise, a second proviso could be added to 
paragraph (2) as follows: 
PROVIDED THAT: such lien shall arise only if 1) the 
property ... and 2) the creditor whose security interest 
is subordinated by this paragraph knew or should have known 
at the time the security interest was taken or filed that the 
debtor was receiving or would receive advance deposits or 
payments in connection with consumer sales or leases. 
In determining whether the creditor "knew or should have 
known" various factors may Ibe considered. It would be rele-
vant for instance that the creditor is substantially engaged in 
financing businesses of the type owned by the debtor. Thus, for 
example, GMAC might be charged with the knowledge that 
consumer purchasers frequently make deposits on automobiles 
to be delivered at a later date. Other relevant factors would be 
whether the creditor has a right to inspect the books and 
accounts of the debtor, the size of the debt in relation to both 
the assets of the debtor and the size of loans made by the 
creditor to other businesses. 
An even stronger requirement could be placed on the oper-
ation of this section by replacing the proviso suggested above 
with: 
2) the creditor whose security interest is subordinated by 
this subsection exercised control over or substantially in-
terferred with the debtor's business while the debtor was 
insolvent and within three months of bankruptcy. 
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If this alternative is adopted, the only creditors affected by 
subparagraph (2) will be those who have attempted to run the 
debtor's business prior to bankruptcy. Since such intervention 
is often aimed at improving the creditor's position in the event 
of bankruptcy and since the interests of consumers are fre-
quently prejudiced by such interference, the equity of sub-
ordinating such a creditor's claim cannot be disputed. Oc-
casionally, though the creditor moves in in order to make an 
honest attempt to rehabilitate the debtor. From the creditor's 
point of view, an informal attempt at rehabilitation will be 
easier and cheaper than instituting proceedings under Chapter 
VII. But, from the consumer's point of view, a successful 
Chapter VII reorganization (under the amendments pro-
posed in the next section of this paper) would mean full 
payment of his claim. It seems only fair that if the plans 
for rehabilitation backfire, a creditor who chooses for reasons 
of his own to act informally should be subordinated in the en-
joyment of his collateral to the consumer creditor who has 
been denied recourse to the proposed payment provisions of 
Chapter VII. 
PROPOSED PRIORITY FOR CERTAIN CONSUMER CLAIMANTS 
In §4-405 of HR 31 priorities of distribution are specified as 
follows: 
1.) administrative expenses, 
2.) certain claims arising between the filing of an involun-
tary petition and adjudication, 
3.) certain wage claims, 
4.) certain contributions to employee benefit plans, and 
5.) certain tax claims 
There are many reasons for adding consumer creditors to 
this list of priorities. Many of them were discussed in the 
last section in connection with the proposed Section 4-403. 
Additionally, one goal of bankruptcy administration ought to 
be to minimize the impact of business failure on the sur-
rounding community. In this context, it is relevant to consider 
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whether the amount of the claim is significant to the creditor 
but insignificant to the estate. While this could hardly be made 
into a general rule of priority, consumer claims (like wage 
claims) are normally within this category and consequently 
deserve special consideration. 
Assuming the advisability of some kind of priority the chief 
questions are where it should be placed and what consumer 
claims should be covered. As for placement of the priority, 
there appear to be two fair alternatives. It could be placed· 
fifth (after wage claims and employee benefits) or it could 
share a third priority with employee wage claims. If the latter 
alternative is adopted, probably some dollar limit should be 
set on the priority. Since the consumer priority covers a num-
ber of situations from the five dollar layaway to the deposit 
paid to a developer on the purchase of a home, a dollar limit 
is difficult to set. Consequently, it is recommended that section 
4-405 be amended by inserting after paragraph (4): 
(5) fifth, among allowed claims arising in connection with 
a sale or lease of goods, real estate or services by the debtor 
to a consumer where such goods, real estate or services were 
purchased or used primarily for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes subject to the limitation that the priority shall 
not exceed the amount paid in money or property to the debtor 
in connection with such sale or lease prior to the filing of a 
petition under sections 4-202 or 4-207, such amount to be re-
duced by the fair market value of property or services 
received by the consumer. A secured creditor whose rights 
to collateral are impaired by a consumer creditor's exercise 
of the lien given in section 4-403 may be subrogated to the 
extent of impairment to the consumer creditor's rights to 
priority under this paragraph if the claim of such consumer 
creditor has been paid in full. 
Renumber paragraphs (5) - (9) as (6) - (10) accordingly. 
By placing the consumer priority in the fifth position behind 
the priority allowed to certain employee claims, the need for 
a dollar limit on the priority is eliminated. 
The language advocated above is sufficiently general to in-
clude all claims arising out of consumer transactions including, 
for example, claims for breach of warranty, for unearned de-
posits, and even for such technical claims as for truth in 
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lending violations. It must be noted, however, that some of 
these claims will not receive priority because they have not 
resulted in actual harm (as measured by the amount paid 
minus the fair market value of the property or services re-
ceived) to the consumer. In fact, to the extent that the con-
sumer's claim represents a penalty or is a claim for multiple 
or punitive damages, it will not even be provable as a gen-
eral, nonpriority claim but will be subordinated under §4-406 
(a) (3) to all other allowable claims. 
Under these proposals some consumer creditors of the deb-
tor will have both a lien under '§4-403 and a priority under 
§4-405. But, because of their lien, these consumer creditors 
will become secured creditors and, under section 4-402 (b), en-
titled to prove only the amount by which their claims exceeds 
the value of their lien. When this occurs and the consumer 
is paid from the collateral of a secured lender, the lender whose 
collateral is impaired gets a right of subrogation to the extent 
of impairment under the last sentence of proposed paragraph 
(5). Arguably, this would be the case even without explicit 
statutory authority127 but it seems wise to settle whatever doubt 
there may be on the matter. The net effect of these changes is 
that the interests of secured creditors will be affected only when 
there are insufficient funds to payoff priority claimants. 
The priorities of §4-405 prescribe the order of payment in 
all liquidation proceedings under Chapter V. They perform a 
different function in Chapter VII reorganizations. As cur-
rently written, HR 31, section 7-303(2) provides that no plan 
of reorganization may be approved unless all of the claims 
entitled to priority under section 4-405, paragraphs (1) - (5) 
(i.e., administrative, post-petition, wage, employee benefit and 
tax priorities) are paid in full. Since under the proposals made 
here consumers will have the fifth priority and tax claims are 
demoted to the sixth, the reference in section 7-303(2) to 
§4-405(a) (1) - (5) should be changed to §4-405(a) (1) - (6). 
127 The general rule of subrogation is that one who pays the debt of another and 
does not do so as a volunteer shall be subrogated to the rights of the person he 
pays as against the person primarily liable. 
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Thus, the net effect will be that payment of consumer claims 
covered by the fifth priority willibe a prerequisite for a success-
ful plan of reorganization. 
ENFORCEMENT OF STATE LAW 
In Chapter 7 reorganizations a tension may develop between 
the goal of bankruptcy administration to benefit creditors by 
maximizing the profitability of the debtor's business and the 
state's interest in fair treatment of its consumers. At a mini-
mum, the federal policy should be limited by the requirement 
that the debtor's business be operated in compliance with 
state law. One effective way to insure such compliance is to 
allow state officials to bring an action for injunctive relief in 
state court. As presently written, ~2-202 makes a state forum 
unavailable by providing for removal of all actions against a 
trustee or a debtor in possession to Bankruptcy Court. To 
remedy this, the following exception is recommended. 
In Section 2-202, after subsection (a) insert: 
(b) Exception-Action by Stale Officer Against a Tmstee, 
Receiver or Debtor in Possession-If a trustee, receiver 
or debtor in possession is authorized to operate the busi-
ness of the debtor under this title, an action maintained 
by an appropriate state officer seeking enforcement of 
state law regulating such business and seeking injunctive 
relief only may not be removed without the consent of the 
state officer maintaining such action. 
Reletter subsections (b) and (c) as (c) and (d) accordingly. 
Similarly, ~405-1 as currently written provides that a peti-
tion in bankruptcy acts as a stay of civil actions affecting the 
debtor's estate. For the reasons presented above, such a stay 
should not be available where a state official seeks only injunc-
tive relief. To accomplish this result, relief from the stay 
should be provided as follows: 
In Section 4-501, subsection (c) insert after paragraph 
(4) : 
(5) The action is one which could not be removed to Bank-
ruptcy Court by reason of Section 2-202(b). 
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One important exception to the jurisdiction of Bankruptcy 
Courts should be noted. In §202-1(d), Bankruptcy Courts are 
denied jurisdiction to try federal criminal offenses. In order 
to avoid the implication that debtors or trustees operating a 
business are exempt from state criminal law or that state 
crimes may be tried in Bankruptcy Court, the following change 
is suggested. 
Section 2-201 (d) 
In place of "of the United States", line 12, insert "of a 
State or of the United States". 
ASSISTANCE FOR CONSUMER CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY 
It is suggested that the following changes be made in HR 31 
with the aim of recognizing a special class of consumer cred-
itors and empowering the attorney general of each state to 
act on their behalf. 
Consumer Creditors 
In section 1-102 after paragraph (12) a definition of a "con-
sumer creditor" should be inserted as follows: 
(13) The term "consumer creditor" shall mean one to 
whom the debtor owes money or some other duty of per-
formance in connection with (A) the sale or lease (by the 
debtor to the consumer) of goods, services or real estate 
purchased or used primarily for personal, family or house-
hold purposes or (B) a deposit of household funds or per-
sonal savings with a landlord or financial institution. 
In section 1-102, renumber paragraphs (13) - (46) accord-
ingly. 
Under this definition, a person becomes a consumer creditor 
merely by having a claim against the debtor which stems from 
a consumer transaction. It is the purpose of the transaction 
rather than the type of claim which is controlling. The status 
of consumer creditor conferred by this definition determines 
both the applicability of the proposed notice and procedural 
provisions which follow and, together with other criteria, the 
consumer's right to a priority under section 4-405 or lien 
under section 4-403. 
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Clearly anyone who is a consumer creditor within the above 
definition will also be within the definition of "creditor" con-
tained in section 1-102(15) of the Act as written. The two 
concepts should not be considered mutually exclusive. To make 
this explicit, a sentence should be added at the end of section 
1-102(15) as follows: 
The term" creditor" shall include a "consumer creditor" as 
defined in section 1-102 (13). 
State Attorney General 
In section 1-102 after paragraph (44), a definition of "state 
attorney general" should be inserted as follows: 
(45) The term "state attorney general" means the attorney 
general of a state or his agent if he is charged under the 
state law with the enforcement of consumer law. In states 
where the primary responsibility for consuiner protection 
rests with some other state officer, the term shall include 
such other state officer. 
In section 1-102, renumber paragraphs (45) and (46) 
accordingly. 
This definition recognizes the fact that the state attorney 
general's office may not, in all states, bear the primary re-
sponsibility for protecting consumers. Where this is the case, 
the above definition allows the state officer who does bear this 
responsibility to perform the functions allotted to state at-
torneys general under these proposals. 
Debtor's Responsibility to Schedule Conswmer Creditors 
Unlike the current Bankruptcy Act, HR 31 does not itself 
explicitly require the debtor to file a schedule of debts. How-
ever, the Commission's comment to section 4-502 explains that 
"it is contemplated that the administrator will by rule pre-
scribe the form and content of such information to be sub-
mitted by the debtor." 128 Although the rules will certainly 
require the debtor to list his creditors, it is recommended that 
section 4-502 be amended as follows: 
128 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. 
Part II, p. 124 (July, 1973). 
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In subsection (a), after paragraph (5), insert: (6) provide 
the names and addresses of all known consumer creditors 
who may have claims against him. Renumber paragraph 
(6) as paragraph (7). 
This change has two objectives. First, consumer creditors are 
often forgotten when the debtor lists his creditors. It is hoped 
that by requiring a separate schedule of potential consumer 
claimants, a debtor will be reminded that some of his cus-
tomers or tenants have or may have claims against him. Sec-
ondly, it is essential to the notice provisions which follow that 
consumer creditors be identified as such as quickly as possible. 
Notice to Consumer Creditors 
Section 4-307 as written requires the administrator to notify 
all creditors (including presumably consumer creditors) of the 
proceedings. Since under the recommendations which follow 
certain state attorneys general may have an interest in the 
proceedings, notice should be given to them as follows: 
In Section 4-307, after subsection (g), insert: (h) Notice to 
State Attorneys General - Whenever the administrator or 
trustee has reason to believe that there may be consumer 
creditors with provable claims, he shall give to the attorney 
general of the state in which he believes such creditors to 
be residing, 
(1) notice of all matters specified in subsections (a) and 
(b) of this section, 
(2) a list of the names and addresses of all known con-
sumer creditors, 
(3) the amount of each such claim if known, and 
(4) if the attorney general so requests, the notices required 
under subsection (c) of this section. 
The notice here required will aid each attorney general in 
making an initial determination as to whether he/she should in-
volve himself in the proceedings and, if he/she decides to do so, 
gives him/her the information needed to inform consumers of 
the availability of assistance in filing claims. 
standing For State Attorneys General 
In addition to aiding individual consumers in proving their 
claims, the attorney general may wish to raise issues affecting 
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eonsumer interests before the administrator of the bankruptcy 
court. There seems to be no reason why he/she should not be 
allowed to do so in cases where consumer interests are sub-
stantial. Thus, the following change is recommended: 
In Section 2-205, after subsection (b) insert: 
(c) Standing for State Attorneys General- Whenever the 
administrator finds that 1) the claims of consumer 
creditors are likely to be greater than twenty-five (25) 
percent of the outstanding indebtedness, 2) the claims 
of consumer creditors are likely to exceed $10,000, 3) 
there are individual consumer creditors with claims 
greater than $1000, or 4) that the interests of consumer 
creditors is otherwise substantial in the administration 
or distribution of the estate, the Attorney General of 
any state in which such consumer creditors reside shall 
have standing to raise any issue affecting the interest of 
consumer creditors before the trustee or by complaint. 
or intervention before the Bankruptcy Court. 
The first three standards specified in this section are in-
tended to provide guidelines for the state attorneys general and 
for the administrator to use in assessing the appropriateness 
of intervention in any particular case. These standards rec-
ognize that consumer interests may be substantial either by 
virtue of their absolute size, the size of individual consumer 
claims or the preponderance of consumer claims in the ad-
ministration of the estate. Nevertheless, these standards are 
not definitive. The desirability of intervention may be affeeted 
by a number of factors including the pre-petition conduct of 
the debtor, the conduct of any of the debtor's major creditors, 
and the efficiency and experience of the intervening attorney 
general. To allow for these factors, the catch-all standard (4) 
promotes flexibility and should be interpreted liberally to allow 
intervention by the attorney general whenever it appears that 
such intervention would not be frivolous. 
Role of The Attorney General in the Proof and Handling of 
Consumer Claims. 
The following provisions aim at providing an alternative 
procedure for the filing and proof of consumer claims. 
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In Section 4-401, after subsection (c), insert: 
(d) Filing by State Attorney General- If a consumer 
creditor of the debtor has failed to file a claim within 
the time prescribed pursuant to subsection (a) of this 
section and if the Attorney General of a state would 
have standing in the proceedings under the criteria 
specified under Section 2-205 (c), the Attorney General 
of a state may execute and file a proof of claim on 
behalf of the consumer creditors of his state in accord-
ance with rules set out by the administrator. Nothing 
in this section or in Section 4-402 (b) shall be con-
strued to create an attorney-client relationship between 
the Attorney General of a state and a consumer creditor 
unless such relationship is expressly claimed by both 
parties. 
In Section 4-402, after subsection (a), insert: 
(b) Treatment of Estimated Claim Filed by State At-
torney General - When a state Attorney Genrral has 
filed a claim pursuant to Section 4-401 (d), the trustrr, 
the debtor, and the state Attorney General shall examine 
the claims filed by consumer creditors pursuant to 
Section 4-401 (a) and any documentation of un filed 
claims in the possession of the Attorney General. The 
trustee shall disallow any improper claims and, where 
appropriate in view of the similarity of the separate 
claims and with the consent of the consumer creditor, 
consolidate the remaining claims for ease of adminis-
tration. The value of the consolidated claims and any 
allowed consumer claims not thought appropriate for 
consolidation shall replace the Attorney General's esti-
mated claim as the claim of such consenting consumer 
creditors. The consolidated claims shall then be allowed 
as claims against the estate. If any consumer's claim is 
disallowed or reduced under this section, the consumer 
creditor whose claim is affected shall be notified by the 
trustee of such disallowance or reduction and the rea-
sons therefore. 
Reletter (b) - (d) as (c) - (e) accordingly. 
Since the deadline for filing claims frequently works to de-
prive consumer creditors of their remedy, the attorney general 
is given authority (if he has standing under the provisions 
recommended above) to file an estimated claim which will pre-
serve the rights of consumer creditors until such creditors are 
identified and the amount of their claims can be ascertained. 
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Rules governing time limits and procedures for filing such 
estimated claims are to be prescribed by the administrator. 
Proposed ~4-402 (b) aims at authorizing a flexible procedure 
whereby the bankruptcy trustee or administrator and the state 
attorney general can work together to handle consumer claims 
accurately and efficiently. For example, in a given caf3e, the 
attorney general may file an estimated claim based on the 
debtor's business records. He might contact potential claim-
ants and ask them to fill out a simple form stating the basis 
(and amount of their claims and to attach any receipts or 
documents they possess. The form might also contain space 
for the consumer to consent to have his claim consolidated. 
The administrator, the debtor, and the attorney general can 
then go through the claims received, allowing them where ap-
propriate and consolidating them where their similarity war-
rants. When distribution of the estate is finally made, the 
attorney general may be authorized by the administrator to 
distribute to individual consumers the dividends on consoli-
dated claims. 
It is hoped that the above changes will make it possible for 
more consumers to prove claims in bankrupt~y. In states where 
the attorney general's office is already active in helping con-
sumers to enforce their rights, the advantages of having that 
office as a place to file claims are considerable. These include 
1) personnel specifically trained to assist consumers with legal 
problems; 2) in some offices the availability of foreign language 
assistance; and 3) more convenient locations. In addition, a 
state consumer office frequently is able to publicize its activities 
and may, by this means, alert consumers to come in and file 
their claims. 
Selection of a Trustee 
In a Chapter V proceeding, a private trustee may be elected 
by certain eligible creditors. In its present form, ~ 5-101 (b) 
provides that creditors who are secured or have priority are 
entitled to vote only the amount of their claims which are in 
excess of the amount of their security or priority. While there 
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are good reasons for not allowing certain priority claimants 
(e.g. tax claimants, those who will have administrative claims) 
to vote for a trustee, such reasons do not apply to consumers 
possessing a priority under proposed § 4-405 (a) (5) 129. Espe-
cially where it is unclear that the unsecured assets will be suffi-
cient to pay priority claims, consumers have a real interest 
in the selection of a trustee. Accordingly, it is recommended 
that the last two sentences of § 5-101 (b) be omitted and that 
the following be substituted in their place: 
A creditor whose claim is secured shall be allowed to vote 
only to the extent that his claim is enforceable for any 
excess of the claim over the value of his security. A creditor 
whose claim is given priority under paragraphs (1) - (4) 
or paragraph (6) of §4-405 shall be allowed to vote only 
to the extent that his claim is enforceable for any excess 
of the claim over the amount of his priority. For the pur-
poses of this section, the administrator may temporarily 
allow claims pursuant to § 4-402. 
It should be noted that § 5-101 (a) authorizes the administrator 
to prescribe rules under which proxies may be solicited. Such 
rules should allow for a state attorney general to obtain proxies 
from consenting consumer creditors. 
In Chapter VII proceedings the trustee is chosen by the ad-
ministrator with the approval of the courts. Since under the 
changes here recommended no plan can' be approved without 
payment of consumer claims, consumers are not so vitally af-
fected by the choice of trustee. 
Creditors' Committees 
As presently written HR 31 allows only actual creditors to 
serve on creditors' committees. Since few consumer creditors 
129 For example, it is impractical (if not impossible) to allow administrative 
claimants a vote. Such people are not properly speaking "creditors" and often 
their identity and the amounts of their claims will not be known prior to selecting 
a trustee. A s for tax claimants, there are legitimate policy reasons for not allowing 
federal and local taxing authorities a disproportionate voice in the selection of a 
trustee. Admittedly, though, there may he good reasons for allowing wage daimants 
a vote should the unions or some other group ever be interested in soliciting their 
proxies. 
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have sufficient experience or a s'ufficiently large claim to par-
ticipate, it seems appropriate to 'allow a state attorney general 
who has intervened in the proceedings to serve on such com-
mittees. This is accomplished by the following amendments to 
~ 5-102 and ~ 7-101. 
At the end of § 5-102(a) add: 
In any case where the Attorney General of a state has stand-
ing under Section 2-205, he shall be eligible for appoint-
ment to a creditors' committee. 
Before the last sentence of § 7-101(a) add: 
Tn any case where the Attorney General of a state has stand-
ing under Section 2-205, he shall be eligible for appoint-
ment to a creditors' committee, 
Involuntary Petitions 
Occasionally, the attorney general of a state learns in the 
course of handling consumer complaints that a business is re-
ceiving down payments for the future delivery of goods or serv-
ices while hopelessly insolvent. Under state law, there may be 
a number of ways in which the attorney general can protect 
consumers from an insolvent business. He may, for example, 
be able to initiate some form of state insolvency proceedings. 
Or, alternatively, he might be able to get an injunction pre-
venting the business from continuing to receive such deposits 
unless they are placed in escrow130• In cases where bankruptcy 
proceedings are reasonably anticipated, a far more efficient 
remedy would be to allow an attorney general to file an involun-
tary petition in bankruptcy. Empowering him to do so would 
prevent useless last minute expenditures by the debtor in liti-
gating issues properly before a bankruptcy court. Consequently, 
~ 4-205 should be amended as follows: 
After subsection (b) insert: 
(c) Attorney General's Petition - Whenever the attorney 
general of a state has reason to believe that a person 
130 For example, many states have consumer protection statutes outlawing 
"unfair and deceptive practices." Under such a standard, a compelling argument 
might he made that it is unlawful to take advance payments from consumers while 
knowing that one's insolvency makes full delivery of goods or services unlikely. 
An attorney general with enforcement powers under the state law might be able 
to obtain an injunction against further receipt or commingling of such deposits. 
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doing business in his state has harmed or will harm 
consumer creditors in an amount greater than $2500 
by reason of his insolvency, the state Attorney General 
may file a petition against such person for relief under 
Chapter V. 
Re-Ietter subsection (c) as subsection (d), and after that 
subsection insert: 
(e) Relief may be granted on a petition by a state Attorney 
General-
(1) if any of the conditions contained in paragraphs 
( 1 ) - ( 3 ) of subsection ( d ) of this section are 
met; and 
(2) it appears that the Attorney General would have 
standing in the proceedings under the criteria 
specifieq. in 92-205 (c) . 
The net effect of these changes is that whenever the attorney 
general determines that there is a probability that the con-
sumers of his state will be harmed in an amount greater than 
$2,500, he has the same ability to file a petition as a creditor 
with a non-contigent claim for $2,500. But, in seeking relief, 
he has the additional !burden of showing that consumer creditors 
will have a substantial interest in the proceedings. Since an 
attorney general would under 4-210(f) be liable for damages 
caused by wrongful filing to the same extent as any creditor, 
it seems reasonable not to make it substantially more difficult 
for him to file an involuntary petition. 
Recovery of Expenses 
Certain expenses incurred by the attorney general in assisting 
consumer creditors should be recoverable from the debtor's 
estate as an administrative expense. 
In section 4-403, subsection (a), after paragraph (11), insert: 
(12) expense incurred by the attorney general of a state 
in notifying consumer creditors of the availability of 
his assistance in filing proofs of claim; in cooperating 
with the trustees in consolidating consumer claims, 
or in performing any of the functions for which a 
creditor could be reimbursed under paragraphs (1) -
(4) or (8) - (10) of this section. 
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Thus, the attorney general is allowed to recover expenses 
actually incurred for notifying consumers and aiding the ad-
ministrator in handling consumer claims. Even if some state 
attorneys general would undertake these responsibilities with-
out reimbursement, this provision provides incentive for the 
administrator and creditors to cooperate fully with an inter-
vening attorney general. A wise administrator might, for ex-
ample, invite the attorney general to join his notice of available 
assistance with the notices sent by the Bankruptcy Court thereby 
saving the expense of a second mailing. 
In addition under this proposal, the attorney general may re-
cover· for certain services rendered to the estate to the same 
extent as other creditors. 
Conclusions 
Something is basically wrong with the Bankruptcy Act that 
it allows a large group of unsuspecting individuals - consumer 
creditors-to receive little or no recovery in the vast majority 
of commercial bankruptcies. The remedies available to con-
sumers under state law and through traditional bankruptcy 
routes all fail to do one essential thing-to assure that some 
funds will be distributed to this class. While amendments to the 
federal law might be drafted to allow individual states to pro-
tect consumers, the goal of uniform administration of the bank-
ruptcy laws as well as security for lenders operating across 
state lines will be upset. Furthermore, it is hard to conceive of 
appropriate state remedies which are neither overbroad nor 
ineffective in securing justice for consumer creditors. The job 
is clearly a federal one. 
The suggestions made here for specific amendments to the 
proposed new Bankruptcy Act will certainly strike some as too 
novel and others as dangerous. They are not intended as threats 
to the commercial community. Rather their purpose is to secure 
a just result from the Bankruptcy Court so that all segments 
of the community injured by the bankrupt's insolvency can 
mitigate their losses equitably. If bankruptcy proceedings .can-
not be made to operate fairly on behalf of consumer creditors 
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as well as business creditors they have failed of their purpose. 
While Congress considers reform of the bankruptcy laws it 
should give careful attention to these proposals and others like 
them. 
